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Abstract
We will study the relationship between product differentiation and price in a
setting where collusion can arise. The standard theory of tacit collusion predicts
an ambiguous relationship between the price supported and product differentiation
under linear demands. Other theories such as the price matching punishment’s
theory of collusion predict a monotonic relationship. We wish to discover the
relationship between product differentiation and prices in an experimental setting
where tacit collusion can arise. Despite the obvious interest both from a theory
point of view and from a policy perspective, this has not been tested before.
Keywords:
Tacit Collusion, Product Differentiation, Experimental Design.
Introduction
Even though explicit collusion among firms is illegal and prohibited in many
countries, it is our position that collusion may still be possible to achieve due to
many relevant factors, such as signalling by price, long-standing repeated interac-
tions and so on. This is so called “tacit collusion”, which means firms in a market
could collude without explicit communication and agreement. In this paper, we are
interested in price collusion of symmetric duopoly markets with different degrees
of product differentiation, but with no money transfers and no communication.
According to Friedman(1971), firms are able to achieve non-cooperative subgame
perfect equilibrium, which enables them to obtain higher profits than Nash profits
in a one-shot game. However, the price under implicit collusion should be in the
interval of one-shot price and monopoly price. Therefore, given some theoretical
assumptions, we aim to investigate whether such collusive price is sustainable in
the long run competition. From this prospective, we want to experimentally clarify




In general, there are two kinds of product differentiation. One refers to “verti-
cal differentiation”; another is “horizontal differentiation”. Vertical differentiation
means that firms focus on developing a ”better product”, thus resulting in different
level of quality and even cost for the similar product(Mussa, Rosen, 1978). There-
fore, all consumers agree over the most preferred mix of characteristics and, more
generally, over the preference ordering. Chang (1991) has concluded that collu-
sion is more difficult when firms are differentiated by levels of quality. Horizontal
differentiation refers to different combinations of characteristics, possibly at com-
parable prices but targeted at different types of customers(Hotelling, 1929). Such
differentiation aims at segmenting customers and maximizing the market share
by creating customer loyalty, thus there is no ranking among consumers based on
their willingness to pay for the product. Tirole (2003) concluded that this kind of
segmentation strategy affects the effect of collusion in two ways. First, it limits
the short-term profit from undercutting rivals due to customer loyalty; second, it
also restricts the severity of price wars and thus the firm’s power to punish a po-
tential deviation. Hence the relation seems contradictive. Moreover, the standard
theory of tacit collusion predicts a non-monotonic relationship between the price
supported and product differentiation under linear demands. Other theories such
as the price matching punishment’s theory of collusion predict a monotonic rela-
tionship. Overall, theoretically the impact of horizontal differentiation on collusive
price seems quite ambiguous.
We are the first research to test the relationship between collusive behavior and
product differentiation by using economic experiments. In order to simplify the
experimental procedures and figure out the clear relationship, we restrict the ex-
perimental design into a duopoly market (Firm i and j), where we create conditions
for tacit collusion to emerge. Within this market, the inverse demand functions
are pi = α− β(qi + γqj), where γ ∈ (0, 1) is considered as the measurement of the
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degree of product differentiation. The closer is γ to zero, the higher the degree of
product differentiation. With this demand function, suppose the production cost
is 0, we fix α, β, vary γ with five different values, and then calculate five different
payoff tables. Subjects in each market will choose price according to the payoff
table in each treatment. Therefore, data availability on different combination of
prices depends on the value of γ.
Our results show that price is decreasing as the γ shifts up, but the probability
of collusion is increasing at the same time, which indicates that the more collusion
has been achieved on lower price as γ becomes bigger. Moreover, we compare the
experimental with theoretical models, and conclude that Price Matching Model is




Most discussion in the traditional industrial organization literature has regarded
product differentiation as one of the primary characteristics in market structure,
which has powerful effect on the performance of firms in the market. Due to the
complexity of product differentiation, it is difficult to discover the relationship
between this kind of market structure and its consequent firm performance. In
this chapter, we will introduce some basic models related to this topic and some
theoretical models with different frameworks in duopoly market.
In reality, even in the duopoly market, two firms probably cannot produce
homogenous commodity. Therefore, the revenue of the two firms not only depends
on the price and pricing strategy they choose, but also on the product differen-
tiation. However, the effect of product differentiation on price collusion is more
complicated. Due to the product differentiation, on one side, a firm maybe cannot
take the entire market by lowering its price in an infinitesimal amount of a single
period. That is to say, higher degree of product differentiation reduces the benefits
of defecting from a collusive agreement, thus, collusion will be easy to support;
5
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on the other hand, if they defect, the punishment may not be very severe, thus,
collusion should be hard to sustain. Overall, the effect of product differentiation
on collusive outcome is ambiguous.
In a differentiated-products market, the pricing decision of a firm depends not
only on its own product (quality, quantity), but also on the substitutability of its
rival’s product, because the high price for its product is strictly restricted when
there are substitutive products in the market. On the other hand, in such kind of
market, firms have strong intensive to coordinate their pricing strategies in order
to avoid price wars. Meanwhile, the intention to deviate from collusive agreement
is also aggressive if the products are differentiated too much, since in this case,
the slight deviation will result in large increase in demand. Therefore, the effect of
product differentiation on the collusive behavior is far from straightforward. In the
subsections, we want to clarify how collusive price is affected by horizontal product
differentiation in the theoretical framework.
1.2 The Setup of Differentiated Product
Suppose two firms are competing in the market, and selling similar products.
The marginal production cost for both firms is constant, and it is normalized to
zero. Each firm faces the following linear demand curve expressing the price , pi,
in terms of demand quantity qi and qj :
pi = α− β(qi + γqj), i, j = 1, 2
where γ(0 < γ < 1)1 denotes the measurement of product differentiation.The
smaller of γ means the higher of product differentiation. In a price competition
1If γ < 0, this demand function is associated with product complements, rather than substi-
tutes. If γ > 1, it means in the pricing stage,the effect of rival’s demand is larger than its own
demand, which is also not allowed
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market, we assume the monopoly profit, deviation profit and one-shot Nash Equi-
librium profit are represented by piM , piD, piN , respectively. We also denote that
firms are willing to collude at the Pareto Frontier of joint profit maximization,
thus splitting the profit equally. Therefore, the highest collusive price should be
the monopoly price. However, whether it is sustainable depends on the deviation
profit and the punishment strategy of the rival.
As for price competition, the demand function is piecewise linear: When the
prices of the two firms are sufficiently close, both firms will have positive demands,
and we can easily get firm i’s demand function in terms of pi and pj by inverting
the inverse demand functions. However, when the prices of the two firms strongly
diverge, the high price firm will receive no demand, while the low price firm captures
the entire market. Specifically, according to Lu and Wright(2007), in order to







< pi < α(1− γ) + γpj;
α−pi
β




0, pi ≥ α(1− γ) + γpj.
With this kink demand function, we can easily solve the best response functions
for the two firms. For example, given any pj set by firm j, firm i’s best response











2−γ2 < pj < α(1− γ2 ).
α
2
, pj ≥ α(1− γ2 ).
Obviously, the corresponding constrain conditions for each portion represent dif-
ferent competitive status. For example, if the rival’s price is low, the best response
function for the two firms is linear upward sloping with γ as the endogenous vari-
able; when the rival’s price is higher, firm i will quote a lower price and try to
capture the whole market; in the case that the rival’s price is very high, firm i’s
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price will be independent of its rival’s price, and also it could achieve the whole
market by setting the monopoly price.
With the best response function above, we calculate the monopoly prices, quan-











respectively. Similarly, the Nash Equilibrium prices, quantities and profits are
pni =
α(1− γ)








β(1 + γ)(2− γ)2 ,
respectively.
In order to simplify the calculation in the experiment to follow, we choose the






(1 + γ)(2− γ)2 ;
In Bertrand Competition, the two firms will try to collude on price if possible.
Obviously, the collusive price should be within the interval of monopoly price and
one-shot Nash equilibrium price, that is to say, pn ≤ pc ≤ pm. However, whether
the collusion can be supported in repeated games depends on the punishment rules
applied when one firm deviates. In the next few sections, we will discuss the re-
lationship between collusive price and product differentiation under some different
punishment rules separately, such as Nash Reversion Model(noted as “NR”), Price
Matching Model(noted as “PM”), T-Period Model (noted as“TP”).
1.3 Nash Reversion
Nash Reversion, as so-called trigger strategy, is the standard punishment strat-
egy in most models about tacit collusion, which assumes that if any firm defects
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from the collusive agreement, the other firm will reverse to the one-shot Nash
equilibrium as soon as the defect is detected. Thus, a small cut in prices results
in the same severe punishment as does a large cut in prices. The threat of this
punishment strategy is somewhat credible since the defection will results in zero
profit. Therefore, this approach facilitates price collusion and makes it even easier
to support monopoly outcomes.
In supergames, the price or quantity depends on the interaction between the two
firms and the discount factor δ. In a related paper, Friedman (1971) introduced
a dynamic reaction function for both firms within the repeated framework. He
concludes that when static games are infinitely repeated, it is possible that firms
set a cooperative price with trigger strategy, even though not explicitly colluding.
Friedman (1968) analyzed the firm’s reaction functions that depend on the past
behavior of the rival in a repeated duopoly game. Based on the assumptions, which
are almost aline with those of Cournot Model, this kind of reaction functions could
be considered as ”tacit collusion”. He has proved the existence of equilibrium points
within this framework, that is to say, in the non-cooperative subgame, firms can
achieve higher profit in repeated game than that in one-shot game, if the discount
rate is high enough. Because the firms’ interaction about reaction functions, they
may be able to implicitly collude to maximize their joint profits with no incentive
to defect and thus increase profits. A firm that defects is possible to suffer adverse
effect- Nash Reversion- in the future, as this will likely lead to a breakdown of the
cartel. Hence, the firm will not defect unless the short-term benefits by doing so
outweigh the long-term costs caused by the breakdown of the cartel. Furthermore,
although explicit collusion is prohibited in many countries, firms are still able to
obtain higher profits by tacit collusion.
The simplest possible version of grim trigger strategy is as follows. Suppose the
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collusive profit per period for each firm is pic, the deviation profit2 is pid , the one-
shot Nash Equilibrium profit3 is pin, and the discount factor is δ . Therefore, each
firm will stick to the collusive agreement on the condition that pic+δpic+δ2pic+· · · ≥
pid + δpin + δ2pin + · · · . thus it implies
δ >
pid − pic
pid − pin .
If the inequality above is satisfied, the collusive profit should be sustainable. It
also shows some interesting comparative static results (see Tirole, 1998 or Motta,
2004). First, from the right side, it is shown that the more firms in the market,
the less likely to sustain collusion; secondly, from the left side, in order to ensure
the collusion stable, the discount rate should be large enough. Additionally, if the
asymmetric information exists among the firms, i.e., they can not observe each
other’s behavior quite often, collusion is also difficult to sustain. Moreover, we
consider δ∗ as the critical value of the discount factor. We will try to explain re-
lationship between collusive profit and discount factor, and furthermore, we will
explore the relationship between collusive price and the degree of product differ-
entiation.
Provided that pdi and q
d
i denote the deviation price and quantity respectively,
when firm i defect from the collusive agreement, while firm j insist on monopoly







< pi < 46(1− γ) + γpmj ;




0, pi ≥ 46(1− γ) + γpmj .








46(1− γ)− pdi + γpmj
(1 + γ)(1− γ) ,
2The current period profit that the firm receives if it deviate when all other firms take the
collusive actions.
3The profit that firm receives following a deviation.
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16(1− γ)(1 + γ) .
We now consider the incentive of deviation from monopoly strategy, when compe-
tition is repeated infinitely, i.e., compare pim with pid. Take the competing behavior
of firm i as an example, based on the calculation above, it is easy to verify








Obviously, in repeated game, firms have strong incentive to lower the price and
earn more profits, which means collusive agreement has been destroyed. In this
case, as the cheated firm, firmj’s profit should decrease, however, no matter how
low the profit is, it cannot be below zero, as we calculate below.
qchj =
46(1− γ)− pmj + γpdi
(1 + γ)(1− γ) =
23(2− 2γ − γ2)






462(2− 2γ − γ2)
8(1 + γ)(1− γ) ≥ 0,
It is easy to check that pichj ≥ 0 for all γ ∈ (0,
√
3 − 1], while negative for all
γ ∈ (√3− 1, 1). This is due to the quantity of cheated firm has been fallen below
zero. Hence, if γ ∈ (√3 − 1, 1), the optimal deviation price and profit for firm i
should be calculated with the constraint of qj = 0. With qj = [46(1 − γ) − pmj +

















, γ ∈ (√3− 1, 1).
Till now, we have discussed the collusive and deviation behavior in one shot
game and repeated games. Based on the analysis above, we conclude that for
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Bertrand Model, firms could successfully achieve higher profit by defecting collusive
(monopoly) agreement, on the condition that the degree of product differentiation
is in the interval [
√
3− 1, 1).
As known, the maximized collusive profit is the monopoly profit in Bertrand





It is easy to calculate the critical value of discount factor based on the calculation








2γ4−3γ3−γ2+8γ−4 , γ ∈ (
√
3− 1, 1).
From figure 1.1, we can see that monopoly is possible to sustain provided δ
Figure 1.1: Critical Discount Factor for NR Model
is greater than 0.5, which means it is easy to achieve collusion for NR Model.
Furthermore, if δ > 0.61, the monopoly price is always supported for any degree of
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product differentiation; if 0.5 < δ ≤ 0.61, the stability of monopoly price depends
on γ; if δ < 0.5, monopoly price cannot be sustained for any γ.
In order to discover the relationship for collusive price and product differenti-
ation when 0.5 < δ < 0.61, we suppose the maximized collusive price is pc, the













, γ ∈ [√3− 1, 1).
Regarding δ > pi
dd−pic
pidd−pin , it is easy to plot the graph for p
c and γ when δ =
0.4, 0.55, 0.9, respectively( See Figure1.2).
However, in this model, the Nash Equilibrium solution is not unique. Because
Figure 1.2: Maximum collusive price for NR Model
from the inequity above, it is easy to conclude that any agreement that yields
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collusive profits pic > pin sustainable should be considered as Nash equilibrium of
the repeated game, if the inequity above is satisfied. And also here the one shot
Nash Equilibrium is not Pareto optimal, since firms could obtain more profits if
they choose collusive price. Therefore, it should be a multiple non-cooperative
equilibria model. Based on this concept, Abreu (1986) predicts that other forms of
punishment may sustain collusive price with a larger range of δ . We will discuss
it in the next section.
In a related paper, Deneckere(1983)discovers the collusive behavior in duopoly
supergames with trigger strategies as defined by Friedman(1971). He calculates
the critical discount factor that could sustain collusion on the monopoly outcome
for both Bertrand and Cournot competition with product differentiation. Fur-
thermore, he finds that as for a low degree of product differentiation, collusion in
quantities is more ”stable” than in price if discount factor is high; as for a high de-
gree of product differentiation, collusive price is more sustainable. Deneckere also
shows that if the collusion could be sustained, the discount rate in Bertrand su-
pergame is non monotone regarding product differentiation. Chang(1990)examines
the relationship between the degree of substitutability and the ability for firms to
collude on price. He concludes that in the Hotelling Model of product differentia-
tion, collusion is easier to sustain as the degree of product differentiation becomes
larger.
Furthermore, one crucial assumption is that the game is repeated infinitely.
However, if the game is finite and known in advance, then the story should be
different. With the backwards induction, both firms exactly know that they will
defect in the penultimate period, and results in the Nash Equilibrium in the final
period. Thus, they will play Nash Equilibrium for every period and collusion
cannot be sustained. In the next chapter, we will discuss how the experimental
design deal with this problem.
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In a related paper, Tyagi (1999) also concludes that with a linear demand func-
tion, high degree of product differentiation hinders tacit collusion in Cournot Com-
petition Model.
1.4 T-Period Punishment
T -period punishment is defined that the punishment period lasts T periods after
either of firm deviates from the collusion, and convert to collusive price afterwards.
Thus it could be regarded as the Nash Reversion punishment if T is infinite. How-
ever, if T is finite, it means the collusive price will return back after a certain
periods, thus it indicates that this kind of punishment rule is not as severe as Nash
Reversion. Collusion should be easier to sustain when the number of periods in
the punishment phase increases. Hence, the conditions for sustaining the collusive
price in this model should be revised from that of Nash Reversion as follows:
pic + δpic + · · ·+ δTpic > pid + δpin + · · ·+ δTpin
Based on the condition above, it is figure out the relation between δ and γ as
well, provided the number of punishment periods T . For simplicity, we fix T = 1.
From Figure 1.3, we could conclude that monopoly price can not be supported any
more. Thus in general, TP punishment rule is not as “credible” as Nash Reversion.
1.5 Optimal Punishments
Abreu (1986,1988)first explores the optimal punishment in infinitely repeated
games with discounting. He defines the optimal penal code, and a strategy profile
as a rule specifying an initial path and punishments for any deviation from the
initial path. If a deviation is detected in period t, then in next period, t + 1,
1.6 Price Matching 16
firms switch to a punishment phase where both firms adopt the punishment action
ap irrespective of which firm is punishing the other. Finally he concludes that
the optimal punishment strategy exists in the discounted repeated games, and it
maybe highly un-stationary, especially in the early stage, the deviation firm will be
punished by a lower payoff than the subsequent stages. Lambson (1987)investigates
the relationship between the optimal penal codes and the discounted profits with
the consideration of participation constraint. They derived optimal punishment
price and the associated critical discount factor for both Bertrand and Cournot
competition in a duopoly supergame with differentiated products, and concluded
that the critical discounted factor to sustain collusive price is as follows(See Figure
1.4). From figure 1.4, it is clear that the discount rate to support collusive price is
lower than NR model, thus resulting that collusion is easier to arrive for OP Model,
compared with that of NR Model. Hence, as for optimal punishment Model, the











, γ ∈ (√3− 1, (3√5− 5)/2];
γ2+γ−1




Price matching, as a punishment strategy in tacit collusion, indicates that if a
customer receives a lower price offered by another seller, the current seller will
match that price. Starting from some collusive price, any price cut is matched by
the other seller but not a price increase. According to Wright and Lu (2007), in-
creased product differentiation makes collusion easier to sustain. They also provide
some conditions that credibly support collusive outcomes under this punishment
strategy and predict a unique collusive price which continuously varies between
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Figure 1.3: Critical Discount Factor for TP Model
Figure 1.4: Critical Discount Factor for OP Model
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marginal cost and the monopoly price as the degree of product differentiation
changes. Furthermore, the most distinct conclusion in this paper is the establish-
ment of monotonic relationship between collusive price and product differentiation,
which is given by the following formula.(See Figure 1.5 as well)
pc =
1− γ
2− (1 + δ)γ
Figure 1.5: Maximum collusive price for PM Model
Chapter 2
Experimental Literature Review
In this chapter, we will review some experimental literature related to this topic.
And also, we will try to find some clues about the design of our experiments, such
as how to choose parameters, how to restrict other factors in order to effectively
achieve our target.
2.1 The Role of Information and Communication
Experiments regarding collusion differ in many subtle ways, for example, the
amount of information that subjects will receive during the experiments, such as,
the market environment, the actions and performances of their rivals. In this
section, we try to find out the effect of such variables on the extent of collusion.
Haan, Schoonbeek and Winkel (2005) reviewed a large variety of experimental
literature on collusion, particularly focusing on the roles of information and com-
munication. They pointed out that as for the competition model, some researchers
prefer Cournot Model, while others prefer Bertrand Model. The choice of the two
19
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competition models is a contentious issue. Holt(1995) argues that Cournot com-
petition is subject to a rather mechanical market-clearing assumption, thus the
experimental results with this competition mode is not efficient. However, Kreps
and Scheinkman (1983)notes that if firms first choose production capacities and
then set prices, the result should be Cournot Equilibrium. Unfortunately, the
experimental evidence on this issue is rather weak. Davis (1999) runs the experi-
ments in triopoly markets with two treatments. In the treatment of a posted offer
market, he concludes that prices decline slowly toward the competitive level.In the
treatment of a posted offer market with advance production, he finds that prices
are somewhat higher, while quantities are somewhat lower. Overall, there is no
convergence to Cournot Equilibrium. Anderhub et al. (2003) focus on the duopoly
markets with heterogeneous goods, in which players first make decision on capac-
ity, and then set the price. Given the capacity choices, subjects set prices at or
close to the equilibrium price most of time, and the capacity choices are clustered
around the competitive equilibrium. Therefore, Anderhub et al. (2003) also find
that capacity-price competition does not result in Cournot outcomes.
Dolbear et al. (1968) experimentally investigate the role of information regard-
ing the Bertrand Model with differentiated products, in which the firm’s demand
function only depends on its own price and the average price of its rivals. Re-
garding their experimental design, in general, player were not informed about the
number of periods in each session (actually 15 market periods), but after each
period, they will be informed about the price their rival has chosen. Specifically,
there are two scenarios: one with complete information, another with incomplete
information. Complete information means that the profits of the payoff tables are
derived from different combinations of the firm’s own price and the average rival’s
price; while incomplete information indicates the profits of the payoff tables are
composed of different values of it own price and a range of possible values of its
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own demand. Moreover, each subject knows that all the subjects will receive the
same payoff tables within one session. After running the experiments with 2, 4,
and 6 firms separately, they found that the number of firms adversely affects the
stability of collusion. However, more information increases price stability within
certainty markets, as measured by the variation of the average price.
2.2 Experimental Tests of the Standard Theory
In this section, we consider some experiments with a close set-up to the theo-
retical model outlined in Chapter 2. We try to figure out some issues, such as,
whether firms in experiment are able to collude without communication, achieve
profits that are consistently above Nash equilibrium profits of one shot game, and
reach the price that maximizes their joint profits.
Huck et al.(2004) find some experimental evidence for Cournot Model without
communication. After each period, firms receive the aggregate information about
the choice of other firms. All subjects are well informed about their own payoff
function, and firms are symmetric. With the experimental results, they find that
in the tow firms market, total output falls below the Cournot predication by about
7% on average. Thus, the duopoly markets manage to collude to some extent.
With a linear demand function, which is commonly used in experiments, perfect
collusion implies that total output falls below the Cournot prediction by 25%.
As for the markets with more than two firms, however, the effect disappears
entirely. Wellford (2002) concludes that experimental price-setting duopolies are
sometimes able to achieve collusive outcomes, but with more than two firms, the
competition is more fierce, and it is very hard to collude, thus leading to competitive
outcomes.
It is important to note that in all the experiments considered so far, subjects
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are not allowed to communicate. Hence, these were all tests of real tacit collusion.
From their reading of the literature, Haan, Schoonbeek and Winkel (2005) sum-
marize the economic experiments that test the standard tacit collusion model as
follows. Duopoly markets are able to collude on price. Yet, they are not able to
achieve perfect collusion: average output is still much closer to Cournot equilib-
rium than it is to monopoly equilibrium. Markets with more than two firms are
are not able to collude on price at all.
Chapter 3
Experimental Design and Research
Procedures
3.1 Main Experimental Issues
It is not always straightforward how to implement economic theory into exper-
iments, because the assumptions of the theories are somewhat difficult to imitate
in the experimental design. In the following two sections, we will investigate some
experimental issues related with experimental design to achieve our target.
In order to test the relationship between product differentiation and collusive
price, we shall (i) fix other variables in the demand function except γ, and con-
sider γ as the independent variable; (ii) try to facilitate collusion on price without
communication. In this section, we will discuss how to meet these requirements in
our experiment.
There are five treatments in our experiment, with five different levels of prod-
uct differentiation. Note that the standard theory about product differentiation
with collusive behavior describes a situation in which firms compete infinitely in
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a duopoly market. Therefore, we randomly paired the participants for each treat-
ment. After the ending period of each treatment, all the subjects will be rematched
for the next treatment. The randomization of pairs was intended to avoid repu-
tation and path-dependence phenomenon. Thus in our experiment, we recruit
participants to attend the five treatments subsequently, but randomly rematched
before each treatment.
Another difference between theory and experiment is that it is impossible to
play an infinitely repeated game in the laboratory. Selten and Stoecker (1986) find
that the behavior in a treatment with a long finite horizon is similar to that in an
infinitely repeated game, except an end-game effect. Therefore, some researchers
try to fix this problem by inserting a fixed probability of continuation after certain
rounds. Another alternative approach is that subjects are not informed about the
exact rounds of each treatment, but only know that the experiment will end with
the instructor’s notice. To some extent, both the two methods above intend to
make the ending round filled with uncertainty to the subjects. In order to make
the experimental process well controlled, we choose the second one to end each
treatment.
Another important issue is the trading institution. Holt(1995)describes an ex-
haustive explanation for all possible trading rules in economic experiments. For
our purpose to search the behavior of sellers, in order to avoid the interaction be-
tween buyers and sellers, we only consider the seller market and select a posted
offer auction as the trading rule. Thus, each seller independently quotes a price in
each round and the profit will be calculated with the linear demand function.
In order to compare the experimental results with theoretical predications, our
experimental design exactly follow the assumptions of the theoretical models (Bertrand
competition Model in duopoly markets). Therefore, in our experiments, subjects
were paired as the rules described above, and we derived the five payoff tables from
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the model above according to the five values of γ(5/22, 9/22, 13/22, 17/22, 21/22)
and δ = 0.9.
3.2 Institutional Formulation
This experiment was computerized, and the software was initially designed by
the author with the platform of ZTree. All the computers (24) were connected
through a local network and isolated into different cubicles. One computer installed
a master program was assigned as the server to control the whole experiment. We
calculate the five payoff tables with the linear demand function and distribute one
by one before each treatment randomly.
48 students were recruited at Nankai University, half from economic and busi-
ness department, half from science faculty. The whole process of this experiment
involves two parts: first is the briefing session taken in the reading room, including
the instructions, test and computer screen. Instructions (see Appendix A) were
translated into Chinese, distributed and read out to all the participants in the read-
ing room by the instructors. The purpose of the test sheet is to clarify whether
the participants have fully understood the instruction. After briefing, participants
were sequently exposed to cubicles of the computer lab and the experiment started
with no communication. During the experiment, subjects were randomly matched
before each treatment, and their identities and histories are private information.
Based on the design of the computer program, each participate will independently
make his/her choice and submitted in every round given the payoff table, and they
will be informed about their previous payoff and the rival’s previous price in the
subsequent round on the screen. Besides, the participants are informed that their
payoffs will be discounted by 0.9 from 11th round and afterwards until this treat-
ment ends. The quoting price page also displays both his/her own price and profit,
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the other seller’s price of the previous round. No other information about the seller
is made public. The ending round is randomly controlled by the programmer after
20 rounds of each treatment, and then all the participants are required to hand in
the payoff tables, meanwhile, we will distribute another table to all participants
for the next treatment.
Therefore, in aggregate, a player made decision for the price of his/her product
more than 100 times. At the end of the experiment, each player was paid by cash
according to his/her cumulative profit. After dividing by 500, the final payoff for
each player was quite close, from maximum RMB72 to minimum RMB60, and
average payoff is RMB65 , which is very close to the local average hourly salary
(RMB30) for undergraduates. The detailed experimental instruction , computer
screen and payoff table are shown in the Appendix C.
3.3 Research Procedures
There are a qualitative predications regarding the maximized collusive price with
differentiated products. Based on our model, we will illustrate some of them below.
According to the values of the parameters in the model for the experiment,
we could calculate the average price of experimental data, Nash Equilibrium and
Monopoly price. On the other hand, based on the three models discussed above,
we could also figure out the collusive prices given different values of γ, and compare
with the experimental results to find out which model best explains the experimen-
tal data.
In order to investigate the relationship between collusive price and product dif-
ferentiation, we will try to statistically run some regressions, and compare the
collusive prices we define with those of the theoretical models, to see whether they
are significantly different or not. The detailed discussion about the results will be
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shown in the next chapter.
Chapter 4
Experimental Results and Predication
The following sections in this chapter report on the experimental results and
compare them with the theoretical predications discussed in the previous chapters.
We will present the descriptive statistic analysis for the selected rounds of each
treatment and predicate the relationship between price and product differentiation.
Furthermore,the comparison between experimental data and the three theoretical
models will be fulfilled by non-linear regression and non parametric analysis.
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
As noted in Chapter 3, the first ten periods without discounting in each treat-
ment are regarded as the learning process for players in each market, in order to
achieve the collusive path. Hence, the data for these periods is not suitable to be
counted in the collusive behavior analysis. Moreover, experimental data generated
from repeated games with discount rate is exactly what the standard theory did.
Therefore, we select the experimental results of 11-20 periods, which could avoid
the ending effect. Hence, our database for analysis is based on 24 markets for ten
periods in each session. A total of 2400 observations of prices was recorded during
28
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the experiment, with 480 observations in each treatment. Descriptive statistics for
the data pooled by treatment is given in figures 4.1, and table 4.1, where ”mean”
is the average price for each treatment, ”Std.D” is the standard deviation. From
the figures, we can see that the growth of γ significantly increases the dispersion
of prices among sessions, and within given sessions as well, as measured by the
variance of the average price in given treatment. The range of price posted in
treatment 1 and 2 is restricted in the interval of [13, 24], while the price disperses
among all the given choices for the rest three treatments.
Table 4.1: Statistical Measurements for Each Treatment.
4.2 Comparison Analysis
With the intuitions we have from descriptive statistics above, we further ex-
plore this relationship by comparison analysis. First, we will compare the average
price in each treatment with one shot Nash equilibrium and monopoly price; sec-
ondly, we differentiate the collusive price from the aggregate data1, and estimate
δ of the three theoretical models (NR,TP and PM) with these two series of data
separately; finally, in order to further explore which model is the best to fit the
1We define“collusive price” as the prices for each market are greater than corresponding Nash
Equilibrium price. And, 1,700 observations meet this requirement.
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(a) γ = 5/22, NE = 20,Mean = 20.88 (b) γ = 9/22, NE = 17,Mean = 19.5
(c) γ = 13/22, NE = 13.4,Mean = 18.8 (d) γ = 17/22, NE = 8.5,Mean = 15.2
(e) γ = 21/22, NE = 2,Mean = 13.6
Figure 4.1: Descriptive Analysis
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experimental data, we compare these two categories of experimental data with the
data series of three models, which are generated by certain reasonable values of δ.
The detailed discussions and results are shown in the next few sections.
4.2.1 Comparison with One Shot Game and Repeated Game
Figure 4.2(a) shows a clear relationship between average price, Nash Equilibrium
and monopoly price, and evolution of these t prices regarding different degree
of γ as well, where “AvP” is defined as the average price of the pooled data,
“NE” means the Nash Equilibrium price, “Av(NE:MP)” means the average level
of Nash equilibrium and monopoly price in order to deeply discover the trend of
average experimental price, in other words, to check average price is closer to NE
or Monopoly price. It is easy to find that both the average experimental price and
“NE” are declining as γ increasing. On the other hand, regarding between-group
analysis, we find that the average price is always greater than the corresponding
”NE”, but undoubtedly lower than the monopoly price. Furthermore, we figure
out that the average output is very close to the middle of NE and Monopoly
price(“Av(NE:MP)”). Hence, we conclude that the collusion on price has been
successfully achieved with discount rate, and the collusive price is downwards as γ
becomes bigger.
Till now, we have some intuitions about the tendency of price as γ increases.
However, since the posting price action by subjects is continuously conducted,
as time went by, besides the impact factor γ, the learning effect may have some
extent of influence on the collusive price. Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish
the impact of γ and time trend on the quoting price separately. The variable of
time trend is defined into two categories, which TD1 means the time slot by each
treatment, that is , all rounds for treatment 1 equals 1, those of treatment 2 equals
2· · · ; TD2 refers to the real time slot happened during the experiment, such as, the
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11th round of treatment 1 is 11, 12th round of treatment 1 is 12, the 11th round
of treatment 2 is 34, the 11th round of treatment 3 is 58 · · · . After generating the
series of TD1 and TD2, we run the linear regressions as follows:
Price = 23.794− 10.425γ (4.1a)
Price = 23.18− 12.394γ + 0.591TD1 (4.1b)
Price = 23.42− 12.219 + 0.023TD2 (4.1c)
All the coefficients in the equations above are significantly different from zero.
In the equation 4.1a, we can see that as γ increases by 0.2, prices will decreases
by 5; In the equation4.1b, the effect of time trend on price is 0.59, which means
prices will climb up by 0.59 after each treatment. As the coefficient of γ becomes
smaller in equation4.1b, compared that of equation 4.1a. The same analysis could
be conducted from equation 4.1c. Thus we statistically conclude that prices are
a decreasing function of γ, but this effect is somewhat offset a little by learning
effect as time goes by. Regarding this result, two steps are necessary to carry out
in order to obtain some deep insight.
How to measure the extent of price decreasing. We try to measure the
mark-up of experimental price on NE, that is, the ratio of (EX-NE)/NE. Hence
regarding this ratio as the dependent variable, we have the estimations in equations
4.2. It is easy to induce that roughly, the mark-up of experimental price on NE
will increase by 12% as γ jump up from 5/22 to 21/22. This percentage should be
higher if we analyze the effect of γ and time trend separately(see equations 4.2b
and 4.2c).
Ratio = −2.54 + 6.75γ (4.2a)
Ratio = −1.59 + 0.8γ − 0.92TD1 (4.2b)
Ratio = −1.928 + 9.757γ − 0.038TD2 (4.2c)
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How the tendency of collusive price 2 evolves as γ increases. We run a
Probit Regression, regarding the probability of collusion as the dependent variable.
The regression results are showed in equations 4.3, in which all the coefficients are
significant. From 4.3a, we find a very interesting story that collusion increases as γ
value goes up, and this effect is offset by some extent as games played as well (see
equation 4.3b and 4.3c). Therefore, we conclude that more markets could collude
on price as γ increases, even though collusive price is lower.
Collusion = −0.394 + 1.675γ (4.3a)
Collusion = −0.56 + 0.876γ + 0.216TD1 (4.3b)
Collusion = −0.478 + 0.925γ + 0.008TD2 (4.3c)
4.2.2 Estimation of δ
In this section we report on the parametric approach to estimate the discount









N6+N7∗δ , γ ∈ (
√
3− 1, 1).
where N1 = −8 + 4 γ + 10γ2 − 9γ3 + 2γ4;
N2 = 8− 4γ − 6γ2 + 5γ3 − γ4;
N3 = 16γ2 − 32γ3 + 24γ4 − 8γ5 + γ6;
N4 = 16γ3 − 12γ4 + 16γ5 − 10γ6 + 2γ7;
N5 = 16γ3 − 12γ4 − 8γ5 + 13γ6 − 6γ7 + γ8;
N6 = −4 + 7γ2 − 5γ3 + γ;N7 = 4− 3γ2 + γ3.
2As defined before.
3we refer to NR, PM, and TP Model because OP model is easier to sustain monopoly price
than NR model given δ = 0.9, thus we will not discuss it any more.
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where M1 = 368− 184γ − 460γ2 + 414γ3 − 92γ4;
M2 = −368 + 184γ + 276γ2 − 230γ3 + 46γ4;
M3 = 184γ2 − 184γ3 + 40γ4;
M4 = 8464− 8464γ − 6348γ2 + 8464γ3 − 2116γ4;
M5 = −8464 + 8464γ + 4232γ2 − 6348γ3 + 2116γ4;
M6 = 2116γ2 − 2116γ3;
M7 = 4− 7γ2 + 5γ3 − γ4;
M8 = −4 + 3γ2 − γ3;




2− (1 + δ)γ (4.4)
As mentioned before, we run the non-linear regressions with aggregate data and
collusive data separately(see table ).In table 4.2, the columns of PM, NR and TP
refer to the estimation of aggregate data, while those of PM(a), NR(a) and TP(a)
refer to the estimation of collusive data, which is composed of 1,700 observations.
With respect to the aggregate data, the estimation results, δNR = 0.502, δTP =
0.78, δPM = 0.869, reveal that price matching model is comparatively the best
model to explain the aggregate data according to AIC value, and the estimation of
price matching model is closest to the actual discount rate used in experiment. As
for the collusive data, we could draw the same conclusion as the aggregate data.
However, the estimation of δ = 0.927 for price matching model differs from that of
aggregate data larger than other models,and it is around the actual value. Hence,
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the collusive price is tracking the price matching model, and the estimation for
Nash Reversion is around 0.5, which is far away from the actual discount rate,
thus Nash Reversion punishment rule is not realistic in practice.
Parameter PM PM(a†)
Estimate AIC Estimate AIC
Delta 0.869 15313.39 0.927 10446.14
(PM Model)
Parameter NR NR(a†)
Estimate AIC Estimate AIC
Delta 0.502 16434.60 0.534 11470.92
(NR Model)
Parameter TP TP(a†)
Estimate AIC Estimate AIC
Delta 0.78 18815.38 0.843 13972.71
(TP Model)
a† represents the collusive data.
Table 4.2: Estimate δ of the Theoretical Models
With the estimation of δ for collusive data above, we compute the equations for
each model and draw the graph together with the average collusive price(see figure
4.2(b)). It is clear that price matching model is closest to the experimental data,
however, they are differed in the right tail, as γ close to 1, PM Model predicates
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the price of zero , while the average collusive price is around 14 in this case, which
is much higher than predication.
4.2.3 Non-parametric Analysis
Based on the estimation of δ above, we first select some reasonable values of
δ = 0.75, 0.8, 0.85, 0.9, and generate the prices series of theoretical models,
respectively. In order to avoid autocorrelation during the comparisons of difference
between experimental results and theoretical models, we pick up the data of some
particular rounds(13th, 15th and 17th rounds for each treatment) instead of the
aggregate data. Tables 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 present the Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test
results of selected data, in which sub-table (a) refers to the regression for aggregate
data, while sub-table (b) refers to that of collusive data. The Z Values of ”EX-NR”
indicate that the both aggregate data and collusive data are significantly different
with the predications of NR Model. The values in bold predicate the acceptance
of hypothesis that no significant difference between measurements, such as for the
aggregate data of 13th round, “EX-TP” of δ = 0.75, “EX-PM” for δ = 0.75 & 0.8;
for the collusive data “EX-TP” of δ = 0.8, 0.85 & 0.9, “EX-PM” of δ = 0.85 & 0.9.
It is clear that the reasonable values of δ for the models have shifted up from
aggregate data to collusive data. The same property and trend happened in 15th
round and 17th round. Hence, we conclude that both TP Model and PM Model
with δ = 0.9 can well fit the collusive data.
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Aggr.Data delta EX-NR EX-TP EX-PM
Z-value Prop. Z-value Prop. Z-value Prop.
0.75 -11.738 0 -1.96 -0.05 -0.348 0.7276
13thperiod 0.8 -11.738 0 -3.108 0.0019 -1.391 0.1643
0.85 -11.738 0 -3.876 0.0001 -2.916 0.0035
0.9 -11.738 0 -4.42 1E-05 -4.811 1E-06
(a)
Collu.Data delta EX-NR EX-TP EX-PM
Z-value Prop. Z-value Prop. Z-value Prop.
0.75 -10.758 0 -2.841 -0.004 -4.85 0
13thperiod 0.8 -10.758 0 -1.493 0.136 -3.407 0.002
0.85 -10.758 0 -0.615 0.539 -1.66 0.077
0.9 -10.758 0 -0.154 0.878 -0.279 0.78
(b)
Table 4.3: Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test for 13th period
Aggr.Data delta EX-NR EX-TP EX-PM
Z-value Prop. Z-value Prop. Z-value Prop.
0.75 -11.832 0 -1.781 0.075 -0.408 0.683
15thperiod 0.8 -11.832 0 -2.907 0.004 -1.259 0.208
0.85 -11.832 0 -3.741 0 -2.718 0.007
0.9 -11.832 0 -4.263 0 -4.842 0
(a)
4.2 Comparison Analysis 38
Collu.Data delta EX-NR EX-TP EX-PM
Z-value Prop. Z-value Prop. Z-value Prop.
0.75 -10.856 0 -3.174 0.002 -4.889 0.36
15thperiod 0.8 -10.856 0 -1.814 0.07 -3.349 0.001
0.85 -10.856 0 -0.733 0.464 -2.08 0.037
0.9 -10.856 0 -0.055 0.956 -0.315 0.753
(b)
Table 4.4: Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test for 15th period
Aggr.Data delta EX-NR EX-TP EX-PM
Z-value Prop. Z-value Prop. Z-value Prop.
0.75 -12.116 0 -3.068 0.002 -0.915 0.36
17thperiod 0.8 -12.116 0 -4.111 0 -2.414 0.016
0.85 -12.116 0 -4.854 0 -4.001 0
0.9 -12.116 0 -5.309 0 -5.801 0
(a)
Collu.Data delta EX-NR EX-TP EX-PM
Z-value Prop. Z-value Prop. Z-value Prop.
0.75 -9.546 0 -2.265 0.023 -4.208 0
17thperiod 0.8 -9.546 0 -1.028 0.304 -2.598 0.009
0.85 -9.546 0 -0.028 0.977 -1.225 0.221
0.9 -9.546 0 -0.562 0.563 -0.811 0.418
(b)
Table 4.5: Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test for 17th period
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(a) Average price, NE price and Monopoly price
(b) Compare average price with theoretical data
Figure 4.2: Comparison with One Shot game and Repeated Games
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Figure 4.3: Price Estimations for the Theoretical Models
Chapter 5
Conclusion
In this paper, our target is to experimentally explore the relationship between
product differentiation and collusive behavior. In chapter 2, we present four theo-
retical models and their predications with Bertrand Competition in duopoly mar-
kets, which indicate the ambiguous relationship between product differentiation
and collusive behavior. After deriving the equations of collusive price as the de-
pendent variable, gamma as the independent variable, we find out a non-monotonic
relationship for NR Model, a decreasing monotonic relationship for PM and TP
Model. Then the experiment was designed upon the assumptions of the theoretical
models, and we chose five values of γ ∈ (0, 1) , thus resulting five treatments.
Briefly, the main findings of the experimental analysis can be summarized as fol-
lows: price is decreasing as γ increases, but the collusion also increases as γ becomes
bigger, which indicates that sellers may achieve more collusion on lower prices as
products converge to homogenous. Furthermore, regarding the comparison with
three theoretical modes, we clarify that price matching model best explains the
experimental data.
There are several directions for future research by relaxing some of the restric-
tions in our models and experimental design, or by exploring the experimental data
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in some other ways. First, instead of price competition, future research can also
study on the framework of Cournot competition. Second, in our experimental de-
sign, the γ value for each treatment is T1=5/22, T2=9/22, T3=21/22, T4=17/22,
T5=13/22, this sequence should have some influence on the posting prices of sub-
jects since the learning effect shall increase as time goes by, which will definitely
shift the price up. Hence, another possible extension is to figure out some ways to
minimally control the learning effect. Finally, in the analysis of experimental data,
we don’t consider the option of non-linear regression of price on γ, which maybe
another way to test our hypothesis.
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Welcome to this economics experiment. The participation fee is 10, and you will
be privately paid at the end of the experiment together with you your accumulated
payoffs. Please note that any communication among participants is strictly forbid-
den. Please raise your hands to ask any questions regarding these instructions.
There are five sections in this experiment. Each period contains several periods,
which are randomly determined by the computer program. In this experiment, you
act as a seller. At the beginning of each section, you will be randomly matched
with another subject into groups of two subjects. In each period, you have to
decide the price of the only product you produce with no cost based on the payoff
tables. To make decisions, you should take into account that:
1) You can choose any integer price between 1 and 25 ECU (an experimental
currency unit). We call this price the posed price.
2) Your payoff depends both on your price and the other seller’s price. The
table below illustrates the interaction of your price and the other seller’s price
on your payoff. The first column is your price, the first row is the other seller’s
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price, and the cells show your payoff. Pay attention that the other seller in your
group also endowed the same payoff table as yours, but the difference is that in
his payoff table, the first column is his/her price, and the first row is your price.
Thus, given a price combination, you can easily find your payoff and the other
seller’s payoff. E.g., if your price is 3ECU and the other seller’s price is 5ECU,
then your payoff should be 35ECU, and the other seller’s payoff should be 0; if
your price is 6ECU, the other seller’s price is 3ECU, then your payoff should be
76ECU, the other seller’s payoff is 45 the other seller’s price and your payoff in
this round will be shown in the next round on the screen. (Note: the payoff table
below is just an example, not the real table in the experiment.) 3) The payoff
Table A.1: Payoff Table(EN).
table will be distributed to everyone before the start of each section and it will
not change within this section. After each section ends, we will go to your cubicles
to collect the payoff tables for previous section while distributing the other payoff
tables for next section. There is no relation between outcomes in one section and
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the payoff tables in subsequent sections.
4) Your payoff will be discounted with the discount rate of 0.9, starting from the
11th period in each section. For example, your final payoff for the 11th period is
the corresponding payoff in the table multiplied my 0.9; your final payoff for round
12 is the corresponding payoff in the table multiplied by 0.92your final payoff for
20th period is the corresponding payoff in the table multiplied by 0.92. The same
calculation path will be followed for other sections.
5) In this experiment, you have to input the price you choose and click ”OK”
on the computer screen. The time slot for making decision of each period is one
minute. Except the requirement above, please don’t execute any other commands
on the computer, such as refreshing the webpage, Backspace, etc.
6) At the end of the experiment, you will receive a monetary reward with 10
participation fee plus your accumulated payoffs for the five sections exchanged at
a rate of 500 ECUs for 1.
If you have any questions about the instruction above, please raise your hand.
Otherwise, I would like to show the main WebPages to you. Please look at the
projector screen.
A.2 Test
1. Look at the payoff table below and find the right answer.
1)If your price is 6, the other seller’s price is 7, thus your payoff is ;
2)If your price is 8, the other seller’s price is 5, thus the other seller’s payoff is
;
3) If your price is 4, the other seller’s price is 9, thus your payoff is ;
4) If your price is 5, the other seller’s price is 4, thus the other seller’s payoff is
Instruction 51
.
2. In period 14, your payoff should be .
a. the payoff corresponding to the table;
b. the payoff in the table multiplied by 0.9;
c. the payoff in the table multiplied by 0.93;
d. the payoff in the table multiplied by 0.94.
Table A.2: Payoff Table for Test(EN).
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Computer Screen and Payoff Table
Figure C.1: Main Computer Screen
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Figure C.2: Example Payoff Table
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